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§ “The difficulty felt by those philosophers who have 
shown themselves to be puzzled by the subject of nega-
tion has not been that they failed to understand the use 
of negative signs,” A.J. Ayer has written. “They have 
been at a loss, not to understand what negative state-
ments are, but only to account for their existence.”1  	  
	  
1 A.J. Ayer, “Negation,” Journal of Philosophy 49 (1952): 
803 [797–815]. 
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Theory is like a Surging Sea 
Michael Munro 
 
§I.  	  
DICHTUNG UND WAHRHEIT	   	  	  
Strictly speaking, does not thought—or the act of 
thinking—always have the capacity for operating 
like a foreign language?2 
~Rey Chow 
 
 
Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten. Witt-	  
2 Rey Chow, Not Like A Native Speaker: On Languaging as 
a Postcolonial Experience (New York: Columbia Universi-
ty Press, 2014), 42. 
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genstein’s imperative translates, “very roughly,” “Phi-
losophy ought really to be written only as poetry.”3 
Yet how is one to approach that directive? How is 
one to read it—as poetry, or philosophy? If poetry, 
following Robert Frost, is, precisely, “what gets lost 
in translation,” how is one to place what’s proposed 
here? And where does that leave philosophy? 
 “Poetry may well be ‘what gets lost in transla-
tion’,” Craig Dworkin has conceded, “though the 
phrase should be understood not in the sense of 
elegiac ruination or privation, but of absorption and 
reverie—in the way one might be lost in thought.”4 
Only in poetry lost in thought, as in another lan-
guage, may philosophy be found. 
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, quoted in Marjorie Perloff, “‘Liter-
ature’ in the Expanded Field,” in Comparative Literature 
in the Age of Multiculturalism, ed. Charles Bernheimer 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 184 
[175–186]. Thomas Basbøll has noted that the Austrian’s 
dictum “means, somewhat less elegantly than the German, 
that ‘one ought really to do philosophy as poetry.’ The 
German word ‘dichten’ is the verb form of ‘Dichtung,’ 
which means ‘poetry.’ To my knowledge there is no such 
thing as poeting in English”: Thomas Basbøll, “Epiphany,” 
The Pangrammaticon, June 18, 2005, http://pangramm 
aticon.blogspot.com/2005/06/epiphany.html. Basbøll con-
cludes, “In any case, modifying Peter Winch’s translation a 
bit, we can render this more naturally as, ‘One ought real-
ly only to compose philosophy (as one composes poetry)’.” 
4 Craig Dworkin, No Medium (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2013), 124. 
	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Giorgio Agamben contends that “in a philosophical 
investigation, not only can the pars destruents not be sepa-
rated from the pars construens, but the latter coincides 
completely with the former.”5 If one can apply to Agam-
ben here another of his methodological principles, the 
transformation of aporia into euporia, and if it is indeed 
true, as he writes, that the pars destruents and the pars 
construens “completely” coincide, what might it be, in-
stead—in the interest of the least displacement—for the 
former to wholly coincide with the latter? And how might 
that transform philosophical investigation? 
 
  
	  
5 Giorgio Agamben, quoted in Adam Kotsko, “What is to 
be Done? The Endgame of the Homo Sacer Series,” An und 
für sich [weblog], March 23, 2014, https://itself.wordpress. 
com/2014/03/23/my-acla-paper-what-is-to-be-done-the-end 
game-of-the-homo-sacer-series/. 

	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§II.  
 
‘WITHOUT THIS NOTHING THINKS’: 
THE ENIGMA OF THE ACTIVE INTELLECT 
 
 
There is perhaps nothing more enigmatic in the 
history of philosophy than that which in the tradi-
tion is known as the active intellect (nous poiêtikos, 
al-‘aql al-fa‘‘āl). The few dense, cryptic sentences in 
which Aristotle gives it its inaugural formulation, 
which comprise the whole of the fifth chapter of 
book three of the De Anima, are on one scholar’s 
estimation the “most intensely studied sentences in 
the history of philosophy.”6 The “obscurity and ex-
treme brevity” of “this half-page chapter,” notes an-
other, “are notorious.”7 In light of that chapter’s 	  
6 Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes 
on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intel-
lect, and Theories of Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 3. 
7 Willy Theiler, quoted in Christopher Shields, “The Ac-
tive Mind of De Anima iii 5,” supplement to “Aristotle’s 
Psychology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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posterity, what is it that so many have so intently 
sought to think by way of it? The chapter in ques-
tion (430a10-25) reads in full:8 
 
Since in all of nature something is the matter for 
each genus (and this is all those things in potentiali-
ty), while something else is their cause and is 
productive (poiêtikon), by producing them all as 
a craft does in relation to the matter it has fash-
ioned, necessarily these same differentiations are 
present in the soul. And one sort of mind exists 
by coming to be all things and one sort of mind 
exists by producing all things, as a kind of posi-
tive state, like light. For in a certain way, light 
makes colors existing in potentiality colors in ac-
tuality. 
And this mind is separate and unaffected and 
unmixed, being in its essence actuality. For what 
produces is always superior to what is affected, 
as too the first principle is to the matter. 
Actual knowledge is the same as the thing 
known, though in an individual potential 
knowledge is prior in time, though it is not prior 
in time generally. 	  
(Spring 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato. 
stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/aristotle-psychology/ 
active-mind.html. 
8  For the translation, and subsequent quotations, see 
Shields, “The Active Mind.” 
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But it is not the case that sometimes it thinks 
and sometimes it does not. And having been 
separated, this alone is just as it is, and this alone 
is deathless and everlasting, though we do not 
remember, because this is unaffected, whereas 
passive mind is perishable. And without this, 
nothing thinks. 
 
However redoubtable may be the exegesis that 
this passage has not ceased to require, the scholarly 
consensus as to its general characterization can be 
simply put. Christopher Shields has done so expertly: 
 
Aristotle introduces a division into mind 
(nous) which he maintains is present generally in 
nature, between the active and the passive (DA 
430a10–14). 
The active mind is compared to a craft, while 
the passive mind is likened to matter (DA 430a12 
–13). 
The active mind is compared to light, which 
in a certain way makes colours that exist in po-
tentiality exist in actuality (DA 430a16–17). 
Having been separated, the active mind alone 
is deathless and everlasting (DA 430a23–24). 
Passive mind, by contrast, is perishable (DA 
430a24–25). 
Because the active mind is unaffected, we are 
not in a position to remember—something or 
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other at some time or other. Unfortunately Aris-
totle does not specify what exactly we cannot 
remember or when (DA 430a23–24). 
Without this (this = either the passive mind 
or the active mind), nothing thinks—or one 
thinks nothing (DA 430a25). 
 
“To the degree that there is agreement about these 
general claims,” Shields comments, “there is com-
mensurate disagreement about how each is to be 
understood and developed.” The chapter’s striking 
last line is here exemplary: 
 
The ambiguity of the last claim provides a useful 
illustration of the sorts of difficulties we encoun-
ter when we approach De Anima iii 5 for careful 
study: in the phrase (‘without this nothing 
thinks,’ or ‘without this x thinks nothing’; aneu 
toutou outhen noei; 430a25), one cannot even be 
sure about the intended referent of the demon-
strative ‘this’ (touto) or about whether ‘nothing’ 
(outhen) is the subject or object of ‘thinks’ (noei). 
Thus, depending upon how it is construed, Aris-
totle’s Greek can be understood in at least four 
different ways: (i) without the active mind, noth-
ing thinks; (ii) without the active mind, the pas-
sive mind thinks nothing; (iii) without the pas-
sive mind, nothing thinks; and (iv) without the 
passive mind, the active mind thinks nothing. 
MICHAEL MUNRO 9 	  
	  
These possibilities are not idle: we find different 
commentators understanding Aristotle’s text in 
these markedly different ways. Each interpreta-
tion seems justifiable in its own terms, and so 
none is indisputably to be preferred over its 
competitors, at least not on narrowly linguistic 
grounds. Interpretive questions thus begin with-
out firm textual data. What holds for this single 
phrase iterates through the entire chapter. 
 
“Consequently, although some progress is to be 
made by minute philological analysis of De Anima 
iii 5,” Shields concludes, “the text as it stands leaves 
unanswered many of the questions with which we 
began.” 
As it stands there is yet one point on which the 
text admits no dispute: what is at issue in that text’s 
every interpretation remains “the act of thinking 
within thought itself.”9 “To think does not mean 
merely to be affected by this or that thing, by this or 
that content of enacted thought,” Giorgio Agamben 
has written, “but rather at once to be affected by 
one’s own receptiveness and experience in each and 
every thing that is thought a pure power of think-
ing.”10 “The experience of thought that is here in 	  
9 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Pat-
ton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 114. 
10 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Poli-
tics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minne-
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question,” in other words, Agamben continues, “is 
always experience of a common power.”11 It is none 
other, and no less, than the commonality of that pow-
er that makes of the active intellect an enigma. Dan-
iel Heller-Roazen has isolated the two components 
all enigmas share: “opacity and the hidden principle 
of their interpretation. That summary may appear 
willfully paradoxical,” Heller-Roazen comments, “yet 
enigmas verify its truth”: Were an enigma “immedi-
ately intelligible, it would be none at all,” yet were an 
enigma “solely solvable by means of knowledge ex-
trinsic to its construction, it, too, could hardly be 
called an ‘enigma’.”12 
The sense in which the active intellect consti-
tutes an enigma is now clear. “The enigma can be 
solved only when the one who hears it knows that it 
turns, allusively, yet systematically, back upon it-
self.”13 The intellect attains its activity only when it 
“turns,” with the decisive lucidity of the one whom 
it traverses, “allusively, yet systematically, back upon 
itself”: the intellect distinguishes itself in its imme-
morial craft by the activity the problem of its activity 
provokes, in the varied acts of intellect the experi-
ence of that activity’s intimate obscurity does not 	  
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 9. 
11 Agamben, Means Without End, 9. 
12 Daniel Heller-Roazen, Dark Tongues: The Art of Rogues 
and Riddlers (New York: Zone Books, 2013), 77. 
13 Heller-Roazen, Dark Tongues, 76. 
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fail to inspire. There is for philosophy in its history a 
resplendence the difficult color of clarity. 
 
Postscript: The Last Chapter in the  
History of the World 
 
Thinking is finding a good quotation.14 
~Paul de Man 
 
“In recent decades, much has been said of quota-
tions and ciphers, but even so, there has been per-
haps insufficient emphasis placed on that anaphoric 
necessity of discourse that makes use of a quotation 
as a key and as an initiation.”15 An “anaphoric ne-
cessity,” indeed: What sense does “anaphora” have 
here, and how does quotation figure its “necessity”? 
 Where it serves “as a key,” where, in its remit, it 
will have effected nothing less than “an initiation,” 
quotation is language in its messianic reduction.16 	  
14 Paul de Man, quoted in Ian Balfour, “The Philosophy of 
Philology and the Crisis of Reading: Schlegel, Benjamin, 
de Man,” in Philology and Its Histories, ed. Sean Gurd 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2010), 210n40 
[192–212]. 
15 Lisa Block de Behar, Borges: The Passion of an Endless 
Quotation, trans. William Egginton (Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 2003), 150. 
16 On the model of the phenomenological reduction, see 
Peter Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: Walter Benjamin 
and the Shape of Time (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2010). Jean-François Lyotard, quoted in Gerhard 
Richter, Afterness: Figures of Following in Modern Thought 
and Aesthetics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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“A recapitulation, a kind of summation,”17 “quota-
tion marks are a summons against language, citing it 
before the tribunal of thought”18: “I read only (even 
here, I confess)”—even here, I confess—“where I do 
not understand, in the very opening of my non-
comprehension.”19 
	  
2011), 14 and 210: “After philosophy comes philosophy. 
But it is altered by the after.” 
17 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commen-
tary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 75. Walter 
Benjamin, “Karl Kraus,” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Ed-
mund Jephcott (New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1978), 
269 [239–273]: “In quotation the two realms—of origin 
and destruction—justify themselves before language. And 
conversely, only where they interpenetrate—in quota-
tion—is language consummated.” 
18 Giorgio Agamben, “The Idea of Thought,” in Idea of 
Prose, trans. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995), 104 [103–104]. 
19 Geoffrey Bennington, Not Half No End: Militantly Mel-
ancholic Essays in Memory of Jacques Derrida (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 126.	  
	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
§ “The attempt to clarify the nature of negation,” Ray 
Brassier has written, “involves enquiring about the being 
of non-being.”20 
 
For it seems only something that is in some sense can 
be negated: otherwise, what content can negation or 
denial have? But that which is not cannot refer to 
something, since something is a sign of one thing and 
hence always refers to a being (something that is), just 
as somethings (plural) refers to several things. But 
then whoever says or utters ‘that which is not’ cannot 
be referring to anything, whether one or many. Con-
sequently, it seems we cannot analyze what we mean 
when we say that which is not, since it cannot refer to 
anything that is either one or multiple. Thus the ex-
pression seems to be devoid of sense. But then are we 
not denying something again and thus invoking the 
very thing which we just said cannot be invoked?21   	  
“One of the disciples is driven to despair when he learns 
that every question only leads to more questions. When he 
asks: then why should we begin? the Rabbi turns the joke 
back on him: ‘You see,’ said Reb Mendel, ‘at the end of an 
argument, there is always a decisive question unsettled’.”22 	  
20 Ray Brassier, “That Which is Not: Philosophy as Entan-
glement of Truth and Negativity,” Stasis 1 (2013): 177 
[174-186]. 
21 Brassier, “That Which is Not,” 178. 
22 Rosmarie Waldrop, Lavish Absence: Recalling and Re-
reading Edmond Jabès (Middletown: Wesleyan University 
Press, 2003), 5. 


	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§III.	  	  
NEARER TO YOU THAN THE SEA 
 
 
for Zahid R. Chaudhary and Eileen A. Joy 
 
 
“Nearer to you than the sea”—it’s with these words 
that L.O. Aranye Fradenburg ends the final sentence 
of a paragraph mid-stream in the argument of her 
final chapter in Staying Alive: A Survival Manual for 
the Liberal Arts, “Life’s Reach: Territory, Display, 
Ekphrasis.”23 In itself and in context the paragraph 
is unremarkable—which is to say, exemplary: from 
biology to neuroscience, from psychoanalysis to 
developmental psychology, to ethology, art, and 
ecology, the range of scholarship cited and discussed 
in a single paragraph is par for the course, as is the 	  
23 L.O. Arayne Fradenburg, “Life’s Reach: Territory, Dis-
play, Ekphrasis,” in Staying Alive: A Survival Manual for 
the Liberal Arts, ed. Eileen A. Joy (Brooklyn: punctum 
books, 2013), 239 [223–262]. 
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artfulness with which it is arranged. Nor is the sen-
tence itself remarkable. A typical final sentence of a 
body paragraph, it offers a paraphrase of the forego-
ing and an example. What one might call a throwa-
way sentence. Almost. I’d like to attempt to situate 
that sentence—“I am, in part, where I am—at a cer-
tain angle to the sun, nearer to you than the sea”—
and to demonstrate its reach today, here, where the 
sea could not be nearer. 
In a 1917 letter to Scholem, Walter Benjamin 
writes, 
Knowledge becomes transmittable only for the 
person who has understood his [sic throughout] 
knowledge as something that has been transmit-
ted. He becomes free in an unprecedented way. 
The metaphysical origin of a Talmudic witticism 
comes to mind here. Theory is like a surging sea, 
but the only thing that matters to the wave (un-
derstood as a metaphor for the person) is to sur-
render itself to its motion in such a way that it 
crests and breaks. This enormous freedom of the 
breaking wave is education in its actual sense: in-
struction—tradition becoming visible and free, 
tradition emerging precipitously like a wave 
from living abundance.24 
24 Walter Benjamin, quoted in Zahid R. Chaudhary, After-
image of Empire: Photography in Nineteenth-Century In-
dia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 
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A series of questions, like a wave, here suddenly 
breaks: That knowledge is not transmittable but 
becomes so (“Knowledge becomes transmittable” 
are the passage’s opening words, and although per-
haps a salutary assertion, it is no less astonishing for 
that)—what precipitates that becoming, and under 
what conditions does it (might it) obtain? When and 
after what fashion can one be said to have under-
stood one’s knowledge “as something that has been 
transmitted”? Can that be an object of knowledge? 
Or is it only then, in transmission, that it’s first giv-
en to be “understood”? What frees knowledge for 
transmission, and in what manner (“unprecedent-
ed,” Benjamin writes) does one who has so under-
stood it become “free”? If it has been transmitted—
and is so understood—is it truly without precedent? 
How freely does the “unprecedented” come to take 
precedence, here? And from where? Is it “metaphys-
ical” that “a Talmudic witticism” comes to mind 	  
193–194. I could have saved face after a fashion—one to 
be interrogated in the following text—and quoted this 
passage from the volume of the correspondence in which 
it appears. But I let the citation stand, not simply for the 
sake of honesty, nor to mark a humdrum scholarly debt. It 
marks an additional—and happy—debt: I had the great 
privilege and pleasure to study with Professor Chaudhary 
at his first teaching post, the University of Washington, 
Seattle. I dedicate this to him fondly and in thanks, and to 
Eileen Joy, without whom—and this is the very least indi-
cation, the most proximal (the nearest!)—this would not 
have been written. 
18 THEORY IS LIKE A SURGING SEA 
here, or is only its “origin” metaphysical? Can that 
be known, and transmitted—and so known as 
transmitted—as it is here, where it comes to mind, 
in a letter? And what precedent does (might) that 
set? 
Must it have come over one like the surging of 
the sea? Or is that “only” a metaphor? 
 That theory “is like a surging sea” makes the 
(attempted) pivot away from it all the more con-
spicuous, if less understandable: What is one to 
make of the syntax of that sentence, of the sudden 
ebb that stems the flow? “Theory is like a surging 
sea, but”—but, yet, however—Benjamin goes on to 
write of “the only thing that matters to the wave”? 
How is one to theorize that transition? How is one 
to understand the manner in which that transmis-
sion breaks? 
 (And what hinges on that parenthetical inser-
tion, “understood as a metaphor for the person”? 
What comes to pass here, very much in passing?) 
 And what is one to make of the swirling break-
water of figurative language here? How does the 
mention of metaphor, one staging the wave as the 
person, the person as wave, named and “understood 
as a metaphor,” complicate the use of simile (“Theo-
ry is like a surging sea”) employed but a few words 
earlier in the same sentence? And what is the rela-
tionship between these two figures? Synecdoche? 
How is that, in turn, to be understood? 
MICHAEL MUNRO 19 	  
	  
 Is this where “theory” comes into the picture? Is 
this what it is “to surrender itself”—oneself, one’s 
self, one self or other, “like a wave”—“to its mo-
tion”? What’s to be made of that motion so as to 
crest and break (“to surrender itself to its motion in 
such a way that it crests and breaks”)? 
Is that something like freedom (“This enor-
mous freedom of the breaking wave …”)? 
Or is it something like education (“… is educa-
tion in its actual sense”)? What would it be to be one 
for whom there is no longer—knowledge having 
become transmittable—a difference between free-
dom and education, and for whom that is “the only 
thing that matters”? 
Would that “in its actual sense” be “instruction”? 
Is this where becoming transmittable transpires, 
instructively, knowledge becoming transmittable 
where tradition becomes “visible”? To what “visibil-
ity,” consequent to what education, might tradition 
become as if luminous? For how “precipitously” 
from “living abundance” would tradition have to 
emerge like a wave for it, in its instruction, to free? 
(As if into the air, into the light, at a certain angle to 
the sun …) 
An emergence “like a wave”? Or, perhaps, like a 
person—“the wave (understood as […] the per-
son)”—a certain person? 
It is living abundance Fradenburg brings “nearer to 
you,” today, remarkably, “than the sea.” 

	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§ “Being is also non-being,” Gilles Deleuze wrote in Dif-
ference and Repetition, “but non-being is not the being of 
the negative; rather, it is the being of the problematic, the 
being of problem and question.”25  Deleuze returned to 
those words in a lesser piece, republishing them four years 
later with an exemplary series of discreet emendations. 
“Non-being is not the being of the negative, but rather the 
positive being of the ‘problematic,’ the objective being of a 
problem and of a question.”26 The positive being of the 
problematic, the objective being of problems and ques-
tions—what is the sense of those additions, and according 
to what necessity does the recourse to elaboration impose 
itself there? How, in other words, is one to understand the 
“‘problematic,’” the “being” of the problematic, in its 
“positivity”?	  
	  
25 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 64; emphasis au-
thor’s. 
26 Gilles Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?” 
in Desert Islands: And Other Texts, 1953-1974, ed. David 
Lapoujade, trans. Melissa McMahon, Charles J. Stivale, Mi-
chael Taormina, et. al. (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 
189–190 [170–192]. 

	  	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§ IV.	  	  
VERTIGO, BEATITUDO:  
SPINOZA AND PHILOSOPHY 	  	  
One could say that every philosopher has two phi-
losophies: his [sic] own and that of Spinoza.27 
~Henri Bergson 
 
Spinozism or no philosophy at all.28 
~G.W.F. Hegel	  	  	  
1. 
 
“We have not yet begun to understand Spinoza,” 
Gilles Deleuze once claimed, “and I myself no more 	  
27 Henri Bergson, quoted in Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: 
An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993), 130n3. 
28 G.W.F. Hegel, quoted in Pierre Macherey, “Hegel Reads 
Spinoza,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
29 (2011): 223 [223–236]. 
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than others,”29 noting elsewhere that “the greatest 
philosophers are hardly more than apostles who 
distance themselves from or draw near to this mys-
tery.”30 
 Here one question eclipses all others, or serves to 
focus them: What would it be to have an adequate 
idea of Spinoza? 
 
2. 
 
Philosophy is the very vertigo of immanence. That 
formula complements one of Deleuze’s: “Immanence is 
the very vertigo of philosophy.”31 Immanence is not 
philosophy, nor philosophy immanence. But there is 
in the passage from one to the other a modification 
of sense that is not without significance. It is per-
haps for that reason that the two formulas are best 
read together. At the point of vertigo. 
But why vertigo? What about philosophy, much 
less immanence, may be said to be vertiginous? Dan-
iel Heller-Roazen has isolated the two components all 	  
29 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. 
Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: 
Continuum, 2006), 12.  
30 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 60. 
31 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 
trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 
180. 
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enigmas share: “opacity and the hidden principle of 
their interpretation. That summary may appear will-
fully paradoxical,” Heller-Roazen comments, “yet 
enigmas verify its truth”: Were an enigma “immedi-
ately intelligible, it would be none at all,” yet were an 
enigma “solely solvable by means of knowledge ex-
trinsic to its construction, it, too, could hardly be 
called an ‘enigma’.”32 
Immanence is the very vertigo of philosophy be-
cause immanence is the very paradigm of the enig-
ma. 
Deleuze’s formula is found in a work Deleuze ti-
tled Spinoza and the Problem of Expression: “By tak-
ing the ‘problem of expression’ as his central con-
cern, Deleuze announces the ingenuity of his ap-
proach. Nowhere in the myriad definitions that the 
Ethics comprises is ‘expression’ defined. Yet the verb 
form of the concept appears on the very first page in 
the definition of ‘God’: ‘By God I mean an absolute-
ly infinite being; that is, a substance consisting of 
infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal 
and infinite essence’.”33 
More remarkable yet, “as soon as it is introduced 
into Deleuze’s argument, the concept ‘expression’ is 
	  
32 Heller-Roazen, Dark Tongues, 77. 
33  Knox Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology: French 
Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 210; emphasis author’s. 
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immediately bifurcated into two senses. The vir-
tue of this concept for Deleuze is that it provides 
a single name for two heterogeneous processes, 
explication and implication. Deleuze argues that 
in Spinozism the modes, as affections of sub-
stance, effectively explicate substance. But it is 
equally true that each modal modification impli-
cates substance in turn. The usual connotations 
of these two words are fully in force in Deleuze’s 
reading; substance is effectively elaborated through, 
that is, explicated by, the modes. But the modes 
implicate substance, in that they impinge on its 
putative autonomy, never leaving it unchanged. 
[…] Deleuze’s point is that in Spinoza substance 
is in an incessant state of unfolding (explication) 
via the modes, and folding back in on itself (im-
plication) as a result of these modal affections.34 
 
To explicate is to implicate, for every implication 
follows from an explication, and every explication 
turns on how what it explicates is implicated in it. 
Philosophy stands to immanence as explication 
stands to implication. 
Philosophy: the vertigo of immanence in its ex-
pression. 
 
 	  
34 Peden, Spinoza Contra Phenomenology, 211; emphasis 
author’s. 
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3. 
 
“Philosophy is something that moves, that passes, 
and that takes place,” Pierre Macherey has written, 
“in a place where the connection between thoughts 
gestates, which, in the works themselves, escapes the 
specific historical conditions of their authors’ un-
dertakings, and the understanding of this process 
diminishes the interest we might extend to their 
systematic intentions, because this process grasps 
them dynamically in the anonymous movement of a 
sort of collective project.”35 
 “Spinoza” is the name given that anonymity by 
those who undergo its movement sub specie aeterni-
tatis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
35  Pierre Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, trans. Susan M. 
Ruddick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2011), 3–4. 
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Postscript: The Unreadable 
 
Whether or not clarity is enough, it is certainly 
not enough to throw around the term ‘clarity,’ 
since that term obviously means very different 
things to different people, and stands in urgent 
need of clarification.36  
~Hans-Johann Glock 
 
What is there more mysterious than clarity?37 
~Paul Valéry 
 
“If reading is not to be simply synonymous with 
deciphering, commentary or even interpretation,” 
Geoffrey Bennington has written, “then it must in-
evitably encounter the question of the unreadable”38: 
“If I can simply read what I read, then what I am 
doing is not in fact reading but something else (pro-
cessing, decoding, unscrambling): reading as such 
occurs only as and in the experience of the unreada-
ble.” 39  Not “processing, decoding, unscrambling,” 
neither is it “deciphering, commentary or even inter-
pretation”—reading is an activity irreducible to any 	  
36 Hans-Johann Glock, “‘Clarity’ is not enough!” in Witt-
genstein and the Future of Philosophy: Proceedings of the 
24th International Wittgenstein Symposium, eds. R. Haller 
and K. Puhl (Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 2002), 83 
[81–98].  
37 Paul Valéry, quoted in Eleanor Cook, Enigmas and Rid-
dles in Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 225. 
38 Geoffrey Bennington, “Editorial,” Oxford Literary Re-
view 33 (July 2011): v [v–vi]. 
39 Bennington, “Editorial,” v. 
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other that may, at first glance, be thought to be syn-
onymous with it. Whatever else it is, reading is not 
something one “simply” does. Nor, it appears, is it 
something one can do “simply.” If “reading as such 
occurs only as and in the experience of the unreada-
ble,” and if the unreadable can be identified with the 
illegible, reading for all that remains no less difficult 
to place. “The very act of recognizing moments of 
illegibility,” Craig Dworkin has written, “cancels 
their status as such; reading the illegible nullifies its 
own account in the precise moment of its construc-
tion and obliterates the very object it would claim to 
have identified, creating a new space of erasure 
which cannot itself be read. In that moment of sin-
gularity the unreadable disappears within its own 
legibility, and that legibility simultaneously effaces 
the text it would seem to read.”40 No longer “simply 
synonymous with deciphering, commentary or even 
interpretation,” yet incapable of articulation without 
their resources, situated “only as and in the experi-
ence of the unreadable,” yet given over to that expe-
rience only insofar as the unreadable itself will have 
escaped one, where—in what sense—may reading 
“as such” be said to “occur”? 
 Writing of novelty in metaphysics, A.W. Moore 
claims it is not simply that a “radically” new way of 
making sense of things will, of necessity, have been 
unforeseeable. “The introduction of a radically new 
way of making sense of things is unforeseeable in 
the more profound sense that, until that way of 
making sense of things has been introduced, there is 	  
40 Craig Dworkin, Reading the Illegible (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 2003), 155. 
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no way even of making sense of its introduction.”41 
As Jean-François Lyotard has observed, “We read” 
—only; necessarily; radically; at all—“because we do 
not know how to read.”42 
	  
41 A.W. Moore, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: 
Making Sense of Things (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 418. 
42  Jean-François Lyotard, quoted in Bennington, “Ed-
itorial,” v. 
	  	  
 
 	  
 
 
§ “By ‘problematic,’” Deleuze clarifies, “we mean the en-
semble of the problem and its conditions.”43 “For Kant,” 
as for Deleuze,44 “problems are 	  
 
(1) transcendent to experience (they are not them-
selves derived from empirical or a posteriori experi-
ence) while having only an immanent employment, 
such that they are (2) organizational principles, which 
(3) do not disappear with their solutions, rendering 
them (4) fictions in that they make no claim to 
knowledge (in their correct or immanent usage) yet 
are nonetheless employed to arrive at knowledge, 
which thus (5) have a true (immanent) and false 
(transcendent) usage, and (6) such that they do not re-
semble their solutions.45 
 
“After I established these things, I thought I was entering 
port; but when I started to meditate […] I felt as if I were 
thrown again into the open sea.”46 	  
43 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 177. 
44 Levi Bryant, Difference and Givenness: Deleuze’s Tran-
scendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 165: “It 
is clear that all six of these properties are precisely what 
Deleuze seeks in the concept of a problem.” 
45 Bryant, Difference and Givenness, 165. 
46 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “A New System of Nature,” 
in Philosophical Essays, eds. and trans. Roger Ariew and 
Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1989), 142 [138–145]. 

	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
§V.  	  
THE IDEA OF PROSE 	  	  
“Any inquiry into prose inevitably meets the per-
plexing example of an illustrious predecessor, 
 
M. Jourdain, the famous bourgeois gentilhomme 
from Molière’s play of the same name. Moved to 
write an amorous epistle to an unattainable lady, 
the bourgeois hires a master of philosophy to in-
struct him in this arcane skill. The master first 
asks him whether the letter is to be written in 
verse. Bourgeois that he is, Jourdain rejects that 
out of hand. ‘You want only prose?’ asks the 
master. ‘No, I want neither prose nor verse,’ an-
swers the bourgeois, who merely wants a seduc-
tive note to be casually dropped at the feet of the 
lady. But the master is less concerned with the 
pragmatics or effects of the note than with taxo-
nomic distinctions. ‘It must be one or the other,’ 
he insists. Expression admits of no other possible 
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forms. Asked why, the master provides the fol-
lowing rule: ‘Tout ce qui n’est point prose est 
vers; et tout ce qui n’est point vers est prose’ 
(Everything that is not prose is verse, and every-
thing that is not verse is prose). M. Jourdain then 
wonders what it is that he is speaking. ‘Prose’ is 
the reply. ‘And when I say: “Nicole, bring me my 
slippers, and give me my nightcap,” is that 
prose?’ At the master’s affirmative answer, Jour-
dain marvels at a competence he did not know 
he had: ‘For over forty years I have been speak-
ing prose without suspecting it in the least.’ He 
returns, however, to his primary concern, the 
composition of the note. He suggests its content, 
a simple cliché, and asks the master to change it 
around, to couch it in a more gallant manner. 
The master essays various permutations on the 
original suggestion but winds up admitting that 
Jourdain’s initial version was the best, which 
leads Jourdain to say: ‘And yet I did not study, 
and I’ve done this on the first try’ (Act 2, scene 
4). 
 Even by the master’s lights (dim as they are), 
M. Jourdain intuitively arrives at correct expres-
sion for his purposes. So what has he learned by 
learning that he was speaking in prose? No in-
sight was gained here, only a label to be applied 
to an activity that had not called attention to it-
self and showed no need of doing so. Yet once 
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the label is available, it becomes a weapon in the 
arsenal of knowledge that M. Jourdain can now 
wield to affirm his superiority over those from 
whom he seeks to differentiate himself. Thus, 
when his wife reprimands him for his foolish-
ness, he retorts by beginning to quiz her (Act 3, 
scene 3): ‘Do you know what you are talking at 
this moment?’ Madame Jourdain clearly has no 
idea what her husband is talking about. To his 
now more refined linguistic sensibility, she ap-
pears to be obtusely concerned with matters of 
content, of evaluation, of pragmatics. ‘What is 
that called?’ M. Jourdain insists. ‘That is called 
whatever one wants to call it,’ she replies. Clear-
ly, she fails to understand the value of a label, 
subscribing to a theory that sees naming as arbi-
trary. She knows there is no knowledge to be 
gained here, just some verbal posturing. ‘C’est de 
la prose, ignorante’ (It is prose, stupid), says the 
gentleman in triumph, who then goes on to re-
state for her the opposition proffered by the 
master that divides the expression of the world 
into two universes. But whereas the master had 
offered two mutually exclusive possibilities, M. 
Jourdain, whose intuitive powers have been rati-
fied by the correctness of his own version of the 
love letters, now unwittingly deconstructs this 
opposition by showing that verse and prose are 
not in a relation of opposition and territorial 
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dominion. He delivers the rule to his wife as fol-
lows: ‘Tout ce qui est prose n’est point vers; et 
tout ce qui n’est point vers n’est point prose’ 
(Everything that is prose is not verse; and every-
thing that is not verse is not prose).47  
 
“We may laugh at the bourgeois’s inability to parrot 
his master’s lesson,” concludes this compelling ac-
count of an “illustrious,” inescapable precursor, “but 
we may well wonder whether, just as he has been 
speaking prose unwittingly, he may unwittingly 
state a truth about it.”48 Indeed, what might that 
truth be, and how might that statement, in its pecu-
liar inconsistency, be said to be of a piece with it? 
If verse can be identified with poetry, prose can-
not be so easily identified with philosophy. “Poetry 
possesses its object without knowing it while philos-
ophy knows its object without possessing it,”49 Gior-
gio Agamben writes, so that “every authentic poetic 
project is directed toward knowledge, just as every 
authentic act of philosophy is always directed to-
ward joy.”50 	  
47 Wlad Godzich and Jeffrey Kittay, The Emergence of 
Prose: An Essay in Prosaics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), ix–x. 
48 Godzich and Kittay, The Emergence of Prose, x. 
49  Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in 
Western Culture, trans. Ronald L. Martinez (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xvii. 
50 Agamben, Stanzas, xvii. 
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Perhaps prose could be said to consist in what’s 
ventured by the proposition: everything that is phi-
losophy is not poetry, and everything that is not poet-
ry is not philosophy. 
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§ “We have now not only traveled throughout the 
land of pure understanding and carefully inspected 
its every part, but have also surveyed it throughout, 
determining for each thing in this land its proper 
place. This land, however, is an island, and is en-
closed by nature itself within unchangeable bounds. 
It is the land of truth (a charming name), and is sur-
rounded by a vast and stormy ocean, where illusion 
properly resides and many fog banks and much fast-
melting ice feign newfound lands. This sea inces-
santly deludes the seafarer with empty hopes as he 
roves through his discoveries, and thus entangles 
him in adventures that he can never relinquish, nor 
ever bring to an end.”51 
	  
51 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. 
Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1996), A 236/B 295. 

	  	  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
§ Before all else there is beauty 	  
Review of S. Oglesby, Theses on Aesthetics as First Philos-
ophy. Seattle: Fabulate Books, 2014. 96 pp. 
	  
The teleology of the Universe is directed to the pro-
duction of Beauty.52 That’s the text’s opening line, its 
first thesis. It’s also a quotation—a quotation and 
provocation from the late work of Alfred North 
Whitehead, one that sets the stage for everything to 
follow. And yet, Oglesby is measured. She immedi-
ately acknowledges that Steven Shaviro—another 
guiding light of the study—“doubtless speaks for 
many” when he calls Whitehead’s claim “outra-
geously hyperbolic.”53 That does not stop her, how-
ever, from going on, still in the very first section, to 
cite and answer Michael Austin’s question, from the 	  
52  Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New 
York: The Free Press, 1967), 264. 
53  Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, 
Deleuze, and Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2009), 69. 
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inaugural issue of Speculations, “Why does anything 
happen at all?”54 “In a word,” our author avers, “ka-
logenesis”: from the Greek kalós (beauty) and genesis 
(creation).55 
Let’s back up a moment. Some context might 
help (especially considering the fact that Oglesby 
doesn’t bother). The work’s title comes from one of 
the stars of Speculative Realism, and the founding 
figure of its most prominent subfield, Object-Or-
iented Ontology, Graham Harman. That aesthetics 
is first philosophy may be the most striking of Har-
man’s many startling claims, and it gets at the heart 
of what he’s up to.56 Since Harman’s well known and 	  
54 Michael Austin, “To Exist is to Change: A Friendly Dis-
agreement With Graham Harman On Why Things Happen,” 
Speculations I (July 2010): 66–83.  
55 The coinage is Frederick Ferré’s, quoted in Brian Hen-
ning, “Re-Centering Process Thought: Recovering Beauty 
in A.N. Whitehead’s Late Work,” in Beyond Metaphysics? 
Explorations in Alfred North Whitehead’s Late Thought, eds. 
Roland Faber, Brian G. Henning, and Clinton Combs 
(New York: Rodopi, 2010), 211n2 [201–214]; http://conn 
ect.gonzaga.edu/asset/file/263/2010HenningRecentering
_Process_Thought _Beyond_Metaphysics.pdf. 
56 The claim is made in many places. See, inter alia, Gra-
ham Harman, “Vicarious Causation,” Collapse II (March 
2007): 221 [187–221]. See also Graham Harman, “Aes-
thetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-Human,” 
Naked Punch 9 (Summer/Fall 2007): 28-30 [21–30]. For 
Harman, “aesthetics is first philosophy” means here, in so 
many words, causality. But one could ask, after Robert 
Jackson’s example, Why? Why is causality, in Timothy 
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widely summarized, I’ll be brief. Examples work 
best. And one of Harman’s favorites is fire and cot-
ton.57 Fire burns cotton. Full stop. That’s the only 
way fire encounters cotton. Cotton’s softness, its 
color, and scent—its price, and where it’s harvested: 
all this (and more) is lost on fire. Fire burns cotton 
but it does not exhaust it. It never gets to its depths. 
And, more to the point, it can’t. Nothing gets to 
anything else’s depths, ever. Each object always ex-
ceeds what it is to other objects, and to the extent 
that an object encounters another object, it does so 
by “alluding” to it—that is, by a kind of translation: 	  
Morton’s words, “wholly an aesthetic phenomenon”? Per-
haps one should keep in mind here Borges’s definition of 
“the aesthetic phenomenon” as “this imminence of a reve-
lation which does not occur.” In other words, perhaps 
“causality” describes what does occur in the imminence of 
revelations that do not. See Robert Jackson, “The Anx-
iousness of Objects and Artworks: Michael Fried, Object 
Oriented Ontology, and Aesthetic Absorption,” Specula-
tions II (May 2011): 154, 167 [135–168]; Timothy Morton, 
“Introduction: Objects in Mirror are Closer than They 
Appear,” Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann 
Arbor: Open Humanities Press/MPublishing, 2013), 19 
[15–39], emphasis author’s; Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths: 
Selected Stories and Other Writings, eds. Donald A. Yates 
and James E. Irby, trans. James E. Irby (New York: New 
Directions, 1964), 188. 
57 The example is used in many places. See, inter alia, Gra-
ham Harman, “A Larger Sense of Beauty,” DIALOGICA 
FANTASTICA, http://dialogicafantastica.wordpress.com/ 
2011/02/01/a-larger-sense-of-beauty/. 
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fire reduces cotton to its flammability. Flame trans-
lates cotton into its tongue. 
And that’s also how to begin to get a handle on 
Harman’s fascinating claim: Aesthetics is first phi-
losophy. First philosophy is (more commonly known 
as) metaphysics. Metaphysics, according to Wilfrid 
Sellars’ famous definition, is how things, in the 
broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, 
in the broadest possible sense of the term. How 
things hang together—the ways in which objects 
translate one another, in other words—can be said 
to characterize aesthetics, in the broadest possible 
sense of that term. So aesthetics is first philosophy. 
 That’s what Oglesby doesn’t tell you. What she 
also doesn’t tell you—not explicitly—is how beauty 
fits into the picture. 
 In her account of beauty, Oglesby follows Shavi-
ro in closely following Kant. The terms here are 
largely those of the “Analytic of the Beautiful.”58 
Disinterestedness? Check. Non-cognitive? Indeed: 
“Beauty,” in Shaviro’s paraphrase, “cannot be sub-
sumed under any concept. An aesthetic judgment is 
therefore singular and ungrounded.”59 Here Oglesby 	  
58 Immanuel Kant, “Analytic of the Beautiful,” Critique of 
Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987), 43–97. 
59 Steven Shaviro, “Accelerationist Aesthetics: Necessary 
Inefficiency in Times of Real Subsumption,” e-flux journal 
46 (June 2013): http://worker01.e-flux.com/pdf/article_89 
69650.pdf. 
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cites Alexander Nehamas by way of clarification. 
“Kant was right that the judgment of taste is not 
governed by concepts. That was not because the 
concept of the beautiful or the nature of the judg-
ment is peculiar, but because, I want to suggest to 
you, 
 
the judgment of taste is simply not a conclusion 
we draw from interacting with, describing, or in-
terpreting works of art. 
I want to turn our common picture around. 
The judgment of beauty is not the result of a 
mysterious inference on the basis of features of a 
work of art which we already know. It is a guess, 
a suspicion, a dim awareness that there is more 
in the work that it would be valuable to learn. 
[…] But a guess is just that: unlike a conclusion, 
it obeys no principles; it is not governed by con-
cepts. It goes beyond all the evidence, which 
cannot therefore justify it, and points to the fu-
ture.60 
 
It’s in attempting to extend the scope of that insight 
that the argument’s at its most tenuous. It “goes 
beyond all the evidence”: Beauty for Oglesby is the 
paradigm of aesthetics as first philosophy insofar as 	  
60 Alexander Nehamas, “An Essay on Beauty and Judg-
ment,” The Three Penny Review 80 (Winter 2000), http:// 
www.threepennyreview.com/samples/nehamas_w00.html. 
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the status of aesthetic judgment as it applies to art, 
specifically, is generalized to stand for the (appar-
ently, problematically) “singular and ungrounded” 
way in which things or objects or whatever—actual 
entities, to adapt Whitehead’s parlance—hang to-
gether. 
 That’s Oglesby’s gamble, anyway. The bulk of 
the work attempts to read the Whitehead-inflected 
treatment of Kant in the crucial first chapter of 
Shaviro’s Without Criteria—a draft of which can be 
found online61—with Ruth Lorand’s Aesthetic Order, 
where beauty is theorized as a type of “lawless or-
der.”62 
So there you have it: a vision of a kind of order—
on the order of the universe—without criteria and 
without law. As to its success or failure, I refer the 
interested reader to the text itself. The details don’t 
much matter here. As Whitehead says, that’s not 
where the action is.63 What I’d like to do instead, in 	  
61 Steven Shaviro, “Without Criteria,” http://www.shaviro. 
com/Othertexts/WithoutCriteria.pdf. 
62 Ruth Lorand, Aesthetic Order: A Philosophy of Order, 
Beauty and Art (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1. 
63 What he actually says is, “It has been remarked that a 
system of philosophy is never refuted; it is only aban-
doned. The reason is that logical contradictions, except as 
temporary slips of the mind—plentiful, though tempo-
rary—are the most gratuitous of errors; and usually they 
are trivial. Thus, after criticism, systems do not exhibit 
mere illogicalities”: Alfred North Whitehead, Process and 
MICHAEL MUNRO 49 	  
	  
the space I have left, is briefly touch on a line of in-
quiry that concerns the project’s strong Kantian 
inheritance, and whose modification may affect its 
plausibility. 
Specifically, I’d like to raise the issue of disinter-
estedness—as Nietzsche did, and with his very 
words: Kant, “instead of envisaging the aesthetic 
problem 
 
from the point of view of the artist (the creator), 
considered art and the beautiful purely from that 
of the ‘spectator,’ and unconsciously introduced 
the ‘spectator’ into the concept ‘beautiful.’ It 
would not have been so bad if this ‘spectator’ 
had at least been sufficiently familiar to the phi-
losophers of beauty—namely, as a great personal 
fact and experience, as an abundance of vivid au-
thentic experiences, desires, surprises, and de-
lights in the realm of the beautiful! But I fear the 
reverse has always been the case; and so they 
have offered us, from the beginning, definitions 
in which, as in Kant’s famous definition of the 
beautiful, a lack of any refined first-hand experi-
ence reposes in the shape of a fat worm of error. 
‘That is beautiful,’ said Kant, ‘which gives us 
pleasure without interest.’ Without interest! Com- 
pare with this definition one framed by a genuine 	  
Reality, eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne 
(New York: The Free Press, 1978), 6. Close enough. 
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‘spectator’ and artist—Stendhal, who once called 
the beautiful une promesse de bonheur. At any 
rate he rejected and repudiated the one point 
about the aesthetic condition which Kant had 
stressed: le désintéressement. Who is right, Kant 
or Stendhal?64 
 
Yet more than the fate of aesthetics hangs in the 
balance. Because as Gilles Deleuze has pointedly 
noted,65 since Kant, aesthetics has named a “wrench-
ing” division: As Daniel W. Smith has aptly (and 
concisely) put it, “Aesthetics since Kant 
 
has been haunted by a seemingly intractable du-
alism. On the one hand, aesthetics designates the 
theory of sensibility as the form of possible expe-
rience; on the other hand, it designates the theo-
ry of art as a reflection on real experience. The 
first is the objective element of sensation, which 
is conditioned by the a priori forms of space and 
time (the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason); the second is the subjec-	  
64 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and 
Ecce Homo, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kauf-
mann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 
1967), 103–104. 
65 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 68, and Gilles 
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, 
trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1990), 260. 
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tive element of sensation, which is expressed in 
the feeling of pleasure and pain (the ‘Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment’ in the Critique of Judg-
ment). Deleuze argues that these two aspects of 
the theory of sensation (aesthetics) can be reu-
nited only at the price of a radical recasting of 
the transcendental project as formulated by 
Kant, pushing it in the direction of what Schel-
ling once called a ‘superior empiricism’; it is only 
when the conditions of experience in general be-
come the genetic conditions of real experience 
that they can be reunited with the structures of 
works of art.66 
 
Oglesby is close to Deleuze here, and so is her wager: 
aesthetics in the—truly—broadest possible sense of 
the term. 
 Aesthetics as first philosophy is a beautiful thing. 
	  
66 Daniel W. Smith, “Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation: Over-
coming the Kantian Duality,” in Essays on Deleuze (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 89 [89–105]. 
But see also Steven Shaviro, “The ‘Wrenching Duality’ of 
Aesthetics: Kant, Deleuze, and the Theory of the Sensi-
ble,” http://www.shaviro. com/Othertexts/SPEP.pdf. 

	  	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  
§ “The interior of the exterior”—that’s Michel Foucault’s 
beautiful phrase for the place of the madman aboard the 
ship of fools, “a prisoner in the midst of what is the freest, 
the openest of routes.”67 The interior of the exterior, or the 
outside: farther away than any external world, closer—
nearer—than any internal world, as Deleuze says.68 “The 
inside as an operation of the outside,”69 “an inside which 
is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were a fold-
ing of the sea.”70 
	  
67 Michel Foucault, quoted in Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, 
trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988), 97. 
68 Deleuze, Foucault, 118. 
69 Deleuze, Foucault, 97. 
70 Deleuze, Foucault, 97. 

	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II 
 
§ On Exactitude in Non-Library Science 
 
Review of Trevor Owen Jones, The Non-Library, Brook-
lyn, NY: punctum books, 2014. 104 pp. 	   	  
On closer inspection, we find here a new reason 
for every island to be and remain in theory desert-
ed.71 
~Gilles Deleuze 
 
It is as if the entire earth were trying to escape by 
way of the island.72 
~Gilles Deleuze 
 
 
Dear T., 
 
Already a few years ago now you composed a corre-
spondence to mark the appearance of Judith Scha-
lansky’s Atlas of Remote Islands: Fifty Islands I Have 
Never Set Foot on and Never Will. I return to that 	  
71 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 10. 
72 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 312. 
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correspondence, on the publication of your first 
book, The Non-Library, because to do so seems to 
me somehow apposite. That may be the reason I 
find myself writing to you, to try to understand my 
sense of just why. 
You note, in the last letter’s closing line, that 
Schalansky’s maps “are, I’m afraid, indeed the terri-
tory.” I wonder if it isn’t exactly on that point—or 
from it, as a point of departure—that the corre-
spondence might, after a fashion, be continued. 
Because the map—not to put too fine a point on 
it—is not the territory. That’s impossible, isn’t it, 
that the map should be the territory? Or maybe it’s a 
clue: When—or more to the point: where—might 
the map in fact be the territory, and what might that 
suggest about our notion of the impossible? 
Judith Balso’s contribution to Pedagogies of Dis-
aster is titled, “To Rely on the Inexistent Impossi-
ble.”73 The inexistent impossible: not the least merit 
of that phrase is that it renders imperative a clarifi-
cation of what, precisely, “the impossible” could be 
said to designate. The impossible is, by definition, 
what is not possible. It is not possible that what is 
impossible could exist. And yet it is not at all clear, 
in the domain of the impossible, where existence 	  
73 Judith Balso, “To Rely on the Inexistent Impossible,” in 
Pedagogies of Disaster, eds. W.J. Vincent van Gerven Oei, 
Adam Staley Groves, and Nico Jenkins (Brooklyn: punc-
tum books, 2013), 495–507. 
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stands in relation to possibility. There is an exist-
ence of the impossible, in the notion of logical im-
possibility perhaps foremost. But is there not some-
thing to the intuition that the impossible, in the 
strict sense, is inconceivable? When you write of the 
Non-Library at “the height of the impossible,” I 
wonder whether the impossible perhaps culminates, 
at its height, in that part of it that does not exist. 
Even then: What, in the impossible, would be the 
relation between existence and non-existence? How 
might one describe, or inscribe, the cartography of 
the impossible? 
That it may not be possible to do so, not unprob-
lematically, is what I understand Balso’s phrase to 
imply. And that’s also the sense of the negative in 
the Non-Library I rely on in reading The Non-
Library. That the map of the inexistent impossible 
may wholly coincide with its territory is something 
the ramifications of which your book might be said 
to catalog. 
Forgive me for going on at length, but I felt the 
need to mark that correspondence, however remote. 
 
To you my thanks and my congratulations. 
 
M.

	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ Coda: The Riddle of History Solved 	  	  
Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it 
knows itself to be this solution.74 
~Karl Marx 
 
The existence of an answer does, it is true, define 
the riddle, but not in the manner we might have 
thought.75 
~Galit Hasan-Rokem and David Shulman 	  	  
“Mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can 
solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it 
will always be found that the task itself arises only 
when the material conditions for its solution already 	  
74 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), 84 [66–
126]. 
75 Editors’ “Afterword,” in Untying the Knot: On Riddles 
and Other Enigmatic Modes, eds. Galit Hasan-Rokem and 
David Shulman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
318 [316–320]. 
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exist or are at least in the process of formation.”76 In 
1842 in the Rheinische Zeitung, and therefore nearly 
two decades before the better known passage of the 
1859 preface, Marx wrote: “The fate which a ques-
tion of the time has in common with every question 
justified by its content, and therefore rational, is that 
the question and not the answer constitutes the 
main difficulty. True criticism, therefore, analyzes 
the questions and not the answers. Just as the solu-
tion of an algebraic equation is given once the prob-
lem has been put in its simplest and sharpest form, 
so every question is answered as soon as it has be-
come a real question.”77 “The existence of a ‘real’ 
answer follows from the posing of any ‘real’ ques-
tion,” a scholarly commentary concurs. “But we can 
now see that the true nature of riddling lies just 
here,” it continues, “in the precarious opacity of the 
solution.”78 If “communism is the riddle of history 
solved,” what formulation of that “riddle” “knows 
itself to be this solution”? After what fashion, into 
what “precarious opacity,” does the riddle of history 
resolve itself? 
 A clue may be found in the contrast between two 	  
76 Karl Marx, “Marx on the History of His Opinions,” in 
The Marx-Engels Reader, 5 [3–6]. 
77 Karl Marx, quoted in Alberto Toscano, “The Politics of 
Abstraction: Communism and Philosophy,” in The Idea of 
Communism, eds. Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek (Lon-
don: Verso, 2010), 204 [195–204]. 
78 Hasan-Rokem and Shulman, “Afterword,” 318. 
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stories—between two instances of self-reference in 
those stories, specifically, and what the self-re-
cognition in each instance implies for how the story 
plays out. “In the Arabian Nights,” first, “we hear of 
Emir Hārūn al-Rashīd, 
 
who became very bored. Nothing could revive 
his spirits. His storyteller asked: ‘Do you want to 
hear the story of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, the mother of 
all stories, the story that relieves all boredom 
forever?’ ‘Do you know the story?’ asked the 
emir. The storyteller confessed that he did not, 
but promised to obtain it for the emir. The emir 
gave him one year and one day to accomplish 
the task, on pain of death. The storyteller dis-
patched his four disciples to the four corners of 
the world to find the story. They returned within 
a year, to be questioned by the emir. Each of the 
first three confessed to having failed to obtain 
the desired story, but told instead of other stories 
and adventures he had encountered. The fourth 
disciple announced that he had found the story. 
‘There was once an emir who became very 
bored,’ began the disciple. ‘His storyteller prom-
ised to obtain for him the story that relieves all 
boredom and dispatched four disciples for the 
task. Three returned empty handed.’ 
‘You are telling me my own story,’ cried the 
emir angrily. ‘But wait, how did you know about 
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the others? You were not present when they 
came back. So perhaps it is a story after all!’ The 
emir became confused. He could not make sense 
of the situation. 
 
“The storyteller suggested he be patient,” so ends 
this account of the fable, “and hear the rest. The 
emir refused. He ordered dancers and musicians to 
be brought in, to divert his mind and make him for-
get the story.”79 In contrast, another fable, “narrated 
by A. K. Ramanujan, tells of a man 
  
who was prompted by his wife to go and listen in 
the evenings to the recounting of the Rāmāyaṇa. 
But each night he fell asleep as soon as the recita-
tion began. When this happened for three con-
secutive nights, his wife scolded him thoroughly 
and commanded him to stay awake. On the 
fourth night, the man forced himself to listen. 
The storyteller described how the king of mon-
keys, Hanuman, sailed through the air over the 
ocean as a messenger from Rāma to the captive 
Sītā. As a sign that Rāma had sent him, Hanu-
man was carrying Rāma’s ring; unfortunately, 
the ring suddenly fell into the ocean. The story-
teller turned to the audience and asked: ‘What 
will Hanuman do now? How can he retrieve the 	  
79 Ilan Amit, “Squaring the Circle,” in Untying the Knot, 
292 [284–293]. 
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ring? How can he be of help to Rāma without it?’ 
The man was deeply moved by what he heard. 
He jumped up, ran to the ocean, plunged in, 
 
“found the ring, and brought it back to Hanuman. 
He then returned to his seat,” our tale concludes, 
“and”—dripping wet—“continued to listen.”80 
 
EXPLICATION DE TEXTE 
 
 To believe in this world.81 
~Gilles Deleuze 
 
Into what then does the riddle of history resolve 
itself? According to Dan Pagis, a riddle is trans-
formed by its solution into a work of art. Specifical-
ly, a poem.82 
 Now at the end of the poem, the solution is 
transformed in turn.83 	  
80 Amit, “Squaring the Circle,” 292–293. 
81 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989), 172; emphasis author’s. 
82 See Dan Pagis, “Toward a Theory of the Literary Rid-
dle,” in Untying the Knot, 81–108. 
83 “If poetry is defined precisely by the possibility of en-
jambment,” Agamben writes, “with deceptive simplicity,” 
Heller-Roazen comments, “it follows that the last verse of 
a poem is not a verse” (emphasis added): Giorgio Agam-
ben, The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics, ed. and trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University 
64 THEORY IS LIKE A SURGING SEA 
Perhaps the solution to the riddle of history can 
be read, immanently, out of the history of the riddle: 
“As long as the riddle is a riddle, it has no solution. 
As soon as a solution is given, it loses its essence as a 
riddle.”84 Yet the story told by the riddle—to take 
the full measure of its poetry—insinuates us directly 
into its midst, challenging us, impossibly, “to oscil-
late between no solution and no riddle, between 
riddle and solution,”85 between poetry and philoso-
phy, that is, vertiginously, between the poetry of the 
riddle of history solved and the philosophy the mo-
ment of whose realization was missed86—the real 
movement, in sum, which abolishes the present state 
of things “to be in touch with all the world,” thereby, 
and “remain alive” to it.87 
Press, 1999), 112. See also Daniel Heller-Roazen, “Speak-
ing in Tongues,” Paragraph 25 (July 2002): 104 [92–115]. 
84 Galit Hasan-Rokem, “‘Spinning Threads of Sand’: Rid-
dles as Images of Loss in the Midrash on Lamentations,” 
in Untying the Knot, 120 [109–124]. 
85 Hasan-Rokem, “‘Spinning Threads of Sand,’” 120. 
86 Theodor Adorno, “Introduction,” in Negative Dialectics, 
trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Continuum, 1973), 3 [3–57]: 
“Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on be-
cause the moment to realize it was missed.” One should 
recall here, for its full sense, Wittgenstein’s dictum, “Phi-
losophy ought really to be written only as poetry.” 
87 Hasan-Rokem, “‘Spinning Threads of Sand,’” 120. Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1987), 280: “Becoming everybody/everything (tout 
le monde) is to world (faire monde), to make a world (faire 
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un monde).” To enter into a zone of proximity with all the 
world so that all the world in turn becomes something 
else: see Fradenburg, Staying Alive. 
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distances would shine in their eyes! 
~Lars Iyer 
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